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Motivated by recently observed industry and government practices, in this paper we endogenize government 
subsidy in a research joint venture (RJV). In particular, we present a three-player game in which a 
government determines the amount of subsidy for a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer 
conducting an RJV on a sustainable product. In addition to the retail and wholesale pricing decisions, the 
firms must determine the level of innovation effort as well as the division of innovation costs between the 
partners. In our analysis we consider two forms of RJV formation (retailer and manufacturer initiated) and 
two types of subsidy (per-unit production subsidy and innovation effort subsidy). We find that: (a) the 
government should never use both types of subsidies simultaneously for any cost-reduction research and 
development (R&D) effort, (b) whenever effort subsidy is present the government is indifferent as to how the 
RJV is formed, and (c) even though firms benefit most from initiating the RJV in many cases, the 
manufacturer is worse off by initiating the RJV if R&D effort increases per-unit production cost, innovation 
or production cost is high and only per-unit production subsidy is present. 




Many governments throughout the world have established clear sustainability policies on 
sustainable development, resource use, and energy efficiency (Canada, 2008; NSW, 2014; 
Obama, 2015). In some cases, governments have incentivized industrial firms in order to meet 
these sustainability policies (Espinoza, 2012). Government incentives may take various forms 
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(Global Subsidies Initiative, 2015). The two major ways producers benefit from government 
subsidy are through a direct cost from the government (e.g., grants and tax concessions) or 
through the market (e.g., a domestic government taxing foreign-made products so heavily that 
they are not competitive with domestic products).  
In practice a government may offer multiple subsidies at the same time, for example tax 
foreign-made products while at the same time providing grants to the same industries to create 
new products. These multiple subsidies may have confounding effects. For example, taxing 
market substitutes may disincentivize new product creation (competition may not be needed as 
competitors’ goods have an effectively higher price), while grants may actually incentivize new 
product creation as innovation is now cheaper. In this paper, we will focus on grant subsidies to 
better understand complexities associated with different types of such subsidies. As market 
subsidies are needed only in the presence of competing products, we do not consider competing 
products in this work. We note that grant subsidy may also take a variety of forms. First, subsidy 
may be a function of the total innovation investment made—what we refer to as innovation effort 
subsidy. For example, to encourage sustainable innovation, part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 allocated $400 million to Advanced Research Projects Agency-
Energy to fund research and development (R&D) of energy technologies (U.S. Congress, 2009). 
Alternatively, subsidy may be a function of the total amount produced; we refer to this subsidy 
as per-unit production subsidy. To illustrate, the Government of India Ministry of Power, 
through the UJALA - Unnat Jyoti By Affordable LEDs for All program, subsidized the 
procurement of LED lightbulbs in the country (Ministry of Power, 2017).   
There are also cases in which the government uses both innovation effort and per-unit 
production subsidy, such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (U.S. Congress, 2005) see sections 
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208 (sugar cane ethanol program), section 609 (rural and remote communities electrification 
grants), and section 202 (renewable energy production incentive).  The United States of America 
and India are not the only countries to consider subsidies.  For example, United Kingdom’s 
innovation agency, Innovate UK, has a series of grants to support collaboration amongst various 
entities to foster sustainable innovation, along with other forms of innovation (InnovateUK, 
2015).  
In addition to governments identifying sustainability as a policy component, consumers 
are willing to pay more for products that are perceived as better for the environment (Nielsen, 
2014)—referred to as sustainable products. In order to appeal to such demands, retailers and 
manufacturers are producing more sustainable goods, such as Clorox’s line of natural cleaning 
products, Green Works (Korn, 2008). However, even with government subsidy, sustainability, 
sustainable products, and environmentally friendly business practices, are growing business 
challenges as the costs of research and development and manufacturing may be prohibitive for 
any one firm alone.  Accordingly, manufacturers and retailers collaborate by spreading costs of 
developing sustainable practices and product via RJVs to make sustainable products.  
In fact, a recent survey of Italian Automotive executives (Rossini, Ciarapica, Matt, & 
Spena, 2016) noted that firms that needed to innovate, in the form of a radical supply chain 
change, to accommodate electric vehicles, are considering entering into RJVs at a higher rate 
than those that do not need to innovate.  In addition, a worldwide survey1 of executives and 
managers by MIT Sloan Management Review (SMR) found that 90% of the 2,587 respondents 
“Agreed or Somewhat Agreed” that collaborations are needed for sustainability (Kiron, 
Kruschwitz, Haanaes, & Reeves, 2015). Those same respondents stated that 47% of their firms 
                                                          
1 In collaboration with The Boston Consulting Group and the United Nations Global Compact 
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are currently engaged in sustainability-related collaborations, with over 50% of these 
collaborations are classified as very or quite successful.  The main reason firms engage in 
sustainability, as found by the MIT SMR survey is to increase their reputation and build their 
brand, followed closely by product and service innovation as well as expanding into new 
markets.   
In addition to the various examples provided by Kiron, Kruschwitz, Haanaes, & Reeves 
(2015), a few specific examples are available; Walmart, for instances, recently worked with its 
manufacturers to reduce the volume of water in laundry detergents, and with Clorox to safely 
concentrate bleach (Baker, 2014). Similarly, AltEn, the world’s largest solar-boat manufacturer, 
formed a joint venture with an Indian firm to make solar boats for the Indian market in which the 
firm procures its critical power components from AltEn. In addition, 33% of solar ferry costs are 
subsidies by the Indian Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (Srinivasan, 2016). Though the 
intents are the same, the dynamics of these RJVs may differ; the retailer may initiate the 
partnership, as in the case of Walmart, or the manufacturer, as in the case of AltEn. We note that 
through a long-term RJV, Sematech, firms such as Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) find that 
they get larger returns than they expected (Office, 1992) while developing next generation 
products for current and new market segments. We reiterate that the main goal of our paper is to 
study how different RJV formation dynamics and subsidy affect sustainable innovations. To 
isolate the desired effects, we do not consider competing product in this study that may be 
generated as a result of a RJV. 
It remains unclear exactly how all of these components fit together in determining 
research efforts, prices, and government subsidy, and this paper considers the following factors: 
government incentives to promote sustainable development and supply chain partners working 
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together in RJVs to make sustainable products. We consider a manufacturer and a retailer selling 
products to consumers. In addition to the wholesale and retail pricing decisions, the supply chain 
partners must decide the level of sustainability effort exerted and each partner’s investment 
responsibilities. Either of the two firms may initiate the collaboration, with the initiating firm 
setting how innovation effort costs are distributed among the collaborating firms. In particular, 
when the retailer initiates collaboration (e.g., Walmart working with Clorox), the retailer 
motivates the manufacturer to exert effort by proposing the amount of innovation cost that it 
would be responsible for, and then the manufacturer decides the level of innovation effort. On 
the other hand, when the manufacturer initiates collaboration (e.g., the AltEn example), the 
manufacturer determines both the collaboration level and the effort level. Though the two 
surveys (Kiron et al., 2015; Rossini et al., 2016) clearly identified that collaborations are needed 
and desired by firms interested in sustainability; the exact formation of the collaboration, which 
party initiates the venture, is not always clearly known by a third-party observer (only the final 
RJV is observed and rarely are RJV dynamics discussed in the literature) and thus we consider 
both formation dynamics. To motivate the supply chain to innovate, the government provides 
per-unit production subsidy and/or innovation investment subsidy. Specifically, we aim to glean 
managerial insights by exploring the following research questions: 
• What is the impact of different types of subsidy (per-unit production versus innovation 
effort) on subsidy parameters, collaboration and effort levels, and firms’ profits? 
• What is the impact of collaboration dynamics (retailer-initiated versus manufacturer-
initiated RJVs) on subsidy parameters, collaboration and effort levels, and firms’ profits? 
The first important message of our paper is that, when it comes to cost-reducing R&D 
effort, the government should never use both types of subsidy simultaneously. When R&D effort 
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instead increases production cost, regardless of which firm initiates the collaboration, we find 
that the government can best incentivize the supply chain to collaborate at the desired level and 
exert the most innovation effort by leveraging both forms of subsidy; the total subsidy required 
when offering both form of subsidy is smaller than if the government used either subsidy by 
itself. Furthermore, in contrast to the government’s preference to offer both types of subsidy, 
manufacturers and retailers are better off if only per-unit subsidy is offered, and are worse off if 
only innovation effort subsidy is offered.  
In light of first-mover advantage, one might expect that firms to prefer initiating rather 
than following in the collaboration process. Interestingly, our results show that this intuition does 
not always hold. In particular, when the government uses per-unit production subsidy alone, the 
manufacturer may be worse off initiating the collaboration when innovation or production is not 
costly. Moreover, we find that the government is indifferent to the collaboration dynamics when 
it provides innovation subsidy, as it induces the same innovation effort, demand, and price.  
These insights will help policy makers and business leaders find win-win solutions when 
pursuing sustainability in response to societal ills (as is the case for governments), or in response 
to consumer demand (as is the case for supply chain partners). Further managerial insights that 
may be gleaned from our results are discussed in the concluding section. 
In the remainder of the paper, we first outline the literature related to our work, following 
which, we present our model and analysis. We then discuss our findings and key insights before 
offering our conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
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Our research is related to three streams of literature in both the operations management (OM) 
and economics literature as it concerns social welfare and government policy, and collaborative 
innovation in sustainable operations. 
The area of sustainable operations is of growing interest in the OM field (Drake & 
Spinler, 2013). For example, Drake et al. (2015) study the impact of tax and cap-and-trade 
regulations on a firm’s technology and capacity decisions. Girotra & Netessine (2013) provide a 
business model framework for firm sustainability and identify four significant contexts to 
consider when creating/augmenting a business model. Considering the effects of environmental 
innovations on both production cost and demand at different stages of the product life cycle, Raz 
et al. (2013) study a newsvendor, determining its innovation efforts at each stage in addition to 
production quantity. However, most literature in this area focuses on single firms’ decisions or 
does not consider government subsidy (see Tang and Zhou (2012) for a review of earlier works) 
while our research incorporates collaborative efforts between two vertical firms when studying 
government’s optimal subsidy policies. 
Within the field of sustainability, one stream close to our work is research studying social 
welfare and regulation. For example, in the context of a closed-loop supply chain, Atasu et al. 
(2013) and many of the references contained therein (e.g., Palmer and Walls (1997) from the 
perspective of environmental economics and Ozdemir et al. (2012) from OM perspective) study 
how the government should design take-back or recycling legislation when incorporating 
externalities of the operations to maximize social welfare. Krass et al. (2013) and Raz and 
Ovchinnikov (2015) consider the use of a government rebate and/or subsidy for firms producing 
public interest goods (goods with externality, for example, through emissions-reducing 
technologies) and analyze the government’s ability to coordinate this system. From the 
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perspective of a non-governmental organization, Kraft et al. (2013) assess whether it is more 
effective to indirectly target the regulatory body or directly target the industry in order to 
influence firms to remove environmentally hazardous substances. Cohen et al. (2016) study how 
demand uncertainty impacts green technology adoption and a manufacturer’s production and 
pricing decisions when designing per-unit government subsidies directly to end consumers. To 
further understand the effect of government subsidy policies on vertical collaboration (see also 
Popp et al. (2009) for a detailed review of earlier works in the field of environmental 
economics), our research specifically considers two distinct subsidy types, upfront innovation 
cost and post-innovation per-unit production cost. 
Our study is also closely related to the area of collaborative innovation. Krishnan and 
Ulrich (2001) and Krishnan and Loch (2005) provide reviews of the literature regarding product 
development and innovation. However, as observed by Ge et al. (2014), most works in this 
literature focused on horizontal R&D cooperation (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009; Ge & Hu, 
2008) (please see Veugelers (1998) for a review of earlier works). Few papers investigate the 
collaboration of firms with vertical relations. Talluri et al. (2010) consider a manufacturer 
allocating funds to its suppliers to improve their performance and find scenarios in which 
manufacturers benefit from collaborating with their suppliers and even amongst themselves in 
improving the performance of a joint supplier. Kim and Netessine (2013) investigate the joint 
effect of asymmetric information and procurement contracting strategies on the collaborative 
effort between supply chain parties, but their focus on collaboration primarily addresses agency 
issues. The research of Ghosh and Shah (2015) is most related to our work in exploring 
collaboration between supply chain players; however, while they consider a retailer-driven and a 
restrictive bargaining game between two firms of equal power, we examine two representative 
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cases in which either the manufacturer or the retailer can initiate collaboration as illustrated in 
the introductory examples to study the effect of relative power in defining contract terms 
between two vertical firms as illustrated in the introduction. Furthermore, we expand on Ghosh 
and Shah (2015) by also contemplating situations in which innovation effort impacts production 
cost. The most distinct difference, however, is while Ghosh and Shah (2015) focus on studying 
the impact of a cost-sharing mechanism from a supply chain perspective (only consider a supply 
chain, retailer and manufacturer), in this paper we shed light into how government subsidy 
programs may be designed to achieve socially best outcome (we consider a supply chain, retailer 
and manufacturer, and a government) with focus on sustainable innovation. To do so, we first 
explore how the relative power of the two supply chain parties of vertical relation affects the 
collaboration. With knowledge of such market dynamics, we then investigate how government 
policy influences the collaborative innovation between these two supply chain entities, which 
directly affect the environment and society. 
To summarize, our research contributes to the literature by analyzing the government 
incentives for a supply chain to collaborate on sustainable innovation (Ghosh & Shah, 2015) that 
benefits not only the supply chain parties and consumers but also the environment and society. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first model jointly considering two types of incentives 
(innovation and production subsidies) and two types of supply chain collaboration (one led by 
the upstream manufacturer and the other led by the downstream retailer). In addition, this paper 
incorporates two themes, production technology choice (relating to environmental performance) 
and forward (multi-echelon) supply chain, among five active themes proposed by Drake and 
Spinler (2013). It also addresses two of the four research gaps, the largely ignored market forces 




3. The Model 
Consider a manufacturer and a retailer that jointly develop a sustainable product. The retailer 
sells the product to customers at a retail price, 𝑝𝑝, and the manufacturer exerts sustainability 
effort, 𝑒𝑒 , and this sustainability effort increases demand. For example, customers may have 
higher utility consuming the new sustainable product, so their willingness-to-pay increases, 
leading to greater demand. In particular, the demand for the product is: 
𝐷𝐷 = 1 + 𝑒𝑒 − 𝑝𝑝. 
Note that without loss of generality, like 𝑝𝑝, we assume 𝑒𝑒 has a leading coefficient of one (effort 
sensitivity of demand 𝛾𝛾 = 1) since the results for arbitrary 𝛾𝛾 can be obtained through a scaling of 
the equilibrium effort 𝑒𝑒′ = 𝑒𝑒
𝛾𝛾
 and corresponding adjustments of other effort-related coefficients. 
To capture the decreasing marginal effect of effort, we assume that the effort cost is of 
the quadratic form, 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2, where 𝑘𝑘 > 0 is the coefficient of the effort cost, similar to Arora and 
Ceccagnoli (2006), and Atasu and Subramanian (2012). We assume the sustainability effort may 
also affect the per-unit production cost, 𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐0 + 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒, with the base cost, 𝑐𝑐0, normalized to zero 
for no effort exerted, where 𝛽𝛽 > 0 represents the scenario in which sustainability effort leads to 
an increase in per-unit production cost. For example, environmentally friendly production 
processes increase the cost of coffee production by about 30% (Kojoyan, 2014). We will 
formally define and discuss the bounds on 𝛽𝛽  in more detail later, but in order for the 
manufacturer to exert positive effort, we further restrict our attention to 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. Similarly, 
throughout our analysis we will find that there are various bounds on 𝑘𝑘, that are functions of 
other exogenous model parameters, which lead to switching in the equilibrium decisions. 
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In order to encourage sustainability innovation, the government provides subsidy, 
collectively referred to as Φ, to the two firms, as discussed in the introductory section. For 
example, the government can provide a tax credit to the firms for each unit produced, i.e., Φ =
𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷, where 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 is the per-unit tax credit for each produced unit. Note that we are assuming 
market-clearing prices; as such, all units produced are sold. The government might also 
encourage innovation by subsidizing the cost of innovation, i.e., Φ = Δ𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2, where 0 ≤ Δ𝑘𝑘 < 𝑘𝑘, 
so the effective cost of innovation reduces to (𝑘𝑘 − Δ𝑘𝑘)𝑒𝑒2. The sustainability effort cost and the 
government subsidy are shared between the two firms with 𝜆𝜆 fraction going to the manufacturer 
and the remaining amount, 1 − 𝜆𝜆, to the retailer. In the case when both forms of subsidy is 
offered, Φ = 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 + Δ𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2. 
The unit payment between the two firms is 𝑤𝑤 , which is commonly known as the 
wholesale price when the payment is from the retailer to the manufacturer, and is the transfer 
payment when the payment is from the manufacturer to the retailer. Given the notation set forth 
in this section, and assuming the only profit the firms and government derive are from the 
considered setting, the profit functions of the manufacturer and the retailer are as follows:  
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 = (𝑤𝑤 − 𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒)𝐷𝐷 − 𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2 + 𝜆𝜆Φ, 
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑤𝑤)𝐷𝐷 − (1 − 𝜆𝜆)𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2 + (1 − 𝜆𝜆)Φ. 
By incorporating positive externality from sustainability innovation, subsidy, firms’ 
profits, and consumer surplus, as commonly defined in the literature (Krass et al., 2013; Raz & 
Ovchinnikov, 2015), the government’s objective function can be expressed as follows: 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺 = 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 − Φ + 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 + 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 +
𝐷𝐷2
2 . 
The first term corresponds to the external benefits of sustainability innovation effort (𝛼𝛼 >
0 is a constant marginal benefit in effort level). Most literature on sustainability (Atasu, Van 
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Wassenhove, & Sarvary, 2009; Raz & Ovchinnikov, 2015) assumes constant marginal benefit in 
quantity unit, i.e., 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷, as the authors focus on the deployment (units sold) of an exogenously 
given sustainable technology, i.e., a predetermined effort level 𝑒𝑒 > 0 and thus a constant 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 > 0 
which can be left out from the objective function. In contrast, our paper focuses on determining 
the optimal effort level in developing sustainability innovation, i.e., an endogenous effort level 
𝑒𝑒 ≥ 0 and thus an indispensable sustainability benefit term 𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒. Therefore, motivated by the work 
of Atasu et al. (2009), and Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015), we use the same linear government 
benefit from the sustainable product, but consider only the direct sustainability benefit through 
innovation effort, 𝑒𝑒. In particular, if there is no effort exerted in equilibrium, then there is no 
government benefit even if many units are sold, as these are not sustainable products which is 
explicitly captured in our model (𝛼𝛼𝑒𝑒 = 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝐷𝐷). The second term in 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺  is the total subsidy 
provided to the two firms, and the remaining terms are the social aspect, which includes the 
profit of the two firms and the consumer surplus. As commonly defined in the literature (e.g., 
Atasu et al. (2009), and Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015)), the consumer surplus is the area of the 
demand curve below a given price, which can be expressed as 𝐷𝐷2/2. 
Recall that executive level personnel surveys found that that firm-to-firm collaboration is 
needed by firms interested in sustainability. However, the dynamics of how those collaborations 
are formed are not explicitly stated. To account for all feasible dynamics, we consider two 
possible collaboration models between the manufacturer and the retailer. The first is when the 
retailer initiates collaboration, as in the motivating example of Walmart working with Clorox. 
Like most of the literature on collaborative innovation (Bhaskaran & Krishnan, 2009), we 
assume that the collaboration level is determined prior to innovation effort being made. 
Therefore, the retailer must motivate the manufacturer to exert effort by sharing the innovation 
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cost. In particular, when the retailer initiates collaboration, it first decides the collaboration 
level, 𝜆𝜆, and then the manufacturer decides the level of effort, 𝑒𝑒. As in Atasu et al. (2009), Krass 
et al. (2013), and Raz and Ovchinnikov (2015), we assume that the government first decides on 
the subsidy programs that maximize its objective function, anticipating the manufacturer’s and 
retailer’s actions. As a result, the game sequence can be stated as follows: 
Step 1: The government decides Φ; 
Step 2: The retailer decides 𝜆𝜆; 
Step 3: The manufacturer decides 𝑒𝑒 and 𝑤𝑤; 
Step 4: The retailer decides 𝑝𝑝. 
The second model is when the manufacturer initiates collaboration, as in the AltEn 
example. In this scenario, the manufacturer determines both the collaboration level, 𝜆𝜆, and the 
effort level, 𝑒𝑒. The game sequence can be stated as follows: 
Step 1: The government decides Φ; 
Step 2: The manufacturer decides 𝜆𝜆, 𝑒𝑒, and 𝑤𝑤; 
Step 3: The retailer decides 𝑝𝑝. 
We solve the game using backward induction, discussed further in the Analysis section. 
Note that we derive technical restrictions on model parameters when ensuring second-order 
optimality conditions and taking parameter positivity constraints into consideration. 
 
4. Analysis 
For ease of exposition, we define system 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, where 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑅𝑅,𝑀𝑀} represents whether the Retailer 
or the Manufacturer initiates the collaboration, and 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑃𝑃, 𝐼𝐼,𝐵𝐵} denotes whether the government 
provides a Per-unit Production subsidy (Φ = 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷), an Innovation effort subsidy (Φ = Δ𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2) or 
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Both types of subsidy (Φ = 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 + Δ𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2). To illustrate, system RI represents the scenario where 
the retailer initiates RJV collaboration, and the government uses innovation effort subsidy to 
encourage the firms to innovate.  
4.1. Analytical Results 
As backward induction as the solving procedure is fairly standard, we refer interested readers to 
Appendix A for the formal analysis but summarize and discuss solutions for two general cases 
separately: the retailer-initiated collaboration with both types of subsidy (RB), and the 
manufacturer-initiated collaboration with both types of subsidy (MB). The same appendix also 
provides the analysis and the equilibrium solutions of the other four cases (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃, 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼, 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃, and 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼).  
Retailer-Initiated RJV Manufacturer-Initiated RJV 
𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 3[2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)]
2𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)2







































Table 1 Equilibrium in Two General RJV Cases 
We note that boundary solutions in the general case reduce to special cases that are 
analyzed separately (in the appendix as the solving procedures are similar), e.g., RP is RB with Δ
𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0 and RI is RB with 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0. It happens to cost-reducing (negative) 𝛽𝛽 cases that interior 
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solutions are not feasible since the corresponding retail prices are negative following the same 
solving procedure. This implies that the government would never use both subsidies 
simultaneously. For ease of exposition in the main text, we present and discuss only interior 
solutions that satisfy joint technical conditions for all cases, in particular, 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1 (the bounds 
are to ensure non-negative solutions and second-order optimality conditions (SOCs)). It is worth-
noting that when all technical conditions are met, all three parties’ profits are increasing in 𝛼𝛼, 
suggesting that sustainability innovation can be a win-win strategy for both the government 
(society) and supply chain partners, if the government (society) benefits significantly from 
sustainable business practices.  
 Next we present and discuss our analytical results for all six scenarios considered (four of 
which are analyzed in Appendix A), two possible collaboration initiators (My v.s. Ry) with three 
possible subsidy offers (xP, xI, and xB). First, Proposition 1 in Section 4.2 compares the 
collaboration level and effort (𝜆𝜆, 𝑒𝑒). Then Propositions 2 and 3 in Section 4.3 compare profits of 
the firms and the government between different types of subsidy and different RJV formation 
dynamics respectively. To not overcrowd the main insights, we refer interested readers to 
Appendix B, where we compare the subsidy parameters (𝑡𝑡,Δ𝑘𝑘) in Proposition B1. The proofs of 
all propositions, those presented in this section and in Appendix B, may be found in Appendix C. 
In addition, in the same appendix, Lemma 1 shows sensitivity analysis of the decisions (𝑡𝑡,
Δ𝑘𝑘, 𝜆𝜆, 𝑒𝑒) with respect to the cost of sustainability innovation, 𝑘𝑘, and how innovation changes the 
per-unit production cost, 𝛽𝛽. As we have indicated earlier, besides ensuring that the second order 
conditions are satisfied, the positivity requirements for the per-unit tax credit 𝑡𝑡 , innovation 
subsidy Δ𝑘𝑘, effort 𝑒𝑒, retail price 𝑝𝑝 and demand 𝐷𝐷 must also be satisfied for all of the systems 




4.2. Collaboration Level and Effort Comparisons 
In this subsection, we examine the impact of both retailer-initiated and manufacturer-initiated 
RJVs on a given type of subsidy (comparisons between systems 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥 and 𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥). Proposition 1 
examines these impacts to the collaboration level, 𝜆𝜆, and effort, 𝑒𝑒. 
 
Proposition 1: 
With the innovation cost sufficiently high: the fraction of the sustainability effort cost covered by 
the manufacturer is always greater under the retailer initiated RJV than the manufacturer 
initiated RJV. Under the retailer initiated RJV: the fraction of sustainability effort cost covered 
by the manufacturer is greatest when only per-unit subsidy is present, followed by when both 
subsidies are present, and finally least when only innovation effort subsidy is present. Under the 
manufacturer initiated RJV: the fraction of the effort cost covered by the manufacturer reverses. 
The innovation effort under the retailer initiated RJV is always weakly dominated by the 
manufacturer initiated RJV regardless of the subsidy present. The innovation effort is always 
greatest when both subsidies are present, regardless of the RJV formation dynamics. Innovation 
effort subsidy results in higher innovation effort than per-unit subsidy, again regardless of the 
RJV formation dynamics.  
 Formally, we write the result as: 
a. 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅;  𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒1;  𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅;  𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
b. 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅;  𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > max [𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅]; 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒2 
c. 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅;  𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > max [𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 , 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅]; 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒3 
where 𝛹𝛹𝑒𝑒1, 𝛹𝛹𝑒𝑒2 and 𝛹𝛹𝑒𝑒3 are defined in the proof. 
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Proposition 1a shows that for any given type of subsidy, the RJV initiator always sets the 
collaboration level such that the RJV initiator would have the follower share more of cost than if 
the follower were the initiator. Moreover, the follower covers the smallest fraction (i.e., 𝜆𝜆 is 
small when the retailer initiates or 1 − 𝜆𝜆 is small when the manufacturer initiates) when the 
government uses innovation subsidy (system 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼) than when the government uses other forms of 
subsidy (cf. Proposition 1b,c). On the other hand, the follower is responsible for the largest 
fraction when the government uses per-unit tax credit subsidy (system 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃). In other words, the 
RJV initiator has the largest share under innovation effort subsidy, but the least share under 
production subsidy.  
With respect to the exerted effort, we first note that the innovation effort is the same 
regardless of the RJV collaboration dynamic, as long as innovation effort subsidy is present. 
This is the case because under the 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, 𝑅𝑅 ∈ {𝐼𝐼,𝐵𝐵},  cases, though the retailer passes a larger 
fraction of the innovation cost to the manufacturer, the government provides larger subsidies to 
compensate the manufacturer for carrying more of the innovation cost. Further, the innovation 
effort is greater when the manufacturer initiates the RJV, and only per-unit production subsidy is 
present and innovation is costly (cf. Proposition 1a). The drivers for the comparison between 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 are similar to those for the comparison between 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅and 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅, and the threshold Ψ𝑒𝑒1 is 
the same as the threshold Ψ1  given in Proposition B1a. According to that discussion, when 
innovation is not costly (𝑘𝑘 is small), the fraction of cost/subsidy (𝜆𝜆) the manufacturer carries is 
small, in an absolute sense. As  𝑘𝑘 increases, the value of 𝜆𝜆 becomes more important, and as such 
the manufacturer would like to keep a larger fraction of the total government subsidy, that is 
greater under a manufacturer initiated setting than a retailer initiated setting. Therefore, since the 
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manufacturer is experiencing a lower net cost from effort, due to retaining a larger fraction of a 
larger subsidy, the effort exerted by the f per-unit subsidy is present. 
We also note that regardless of the RJV structure, the highest effort is always exerted 
when both forms of subsidy are present (cf. Propositions 1b,c). When only a single type of 
subsidy is present, the innovation effort is higher when the government uses innovation effort 
subsidy only if innovation is costly (𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒2 for the comparison between 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅, and 𝑘𝑘 >
Ψ𝑒𝑒3 for the comparison between 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅). Effort levels when only a single type of subsidy 
is present follows from the fact that if the subsidies are fixed, and effort level increases, per-unit 
subsidy only has a linear benefit for the manufacturer for every unit of effort increase, while 
innovation effort subsidy has quadratic benefit for every unit of effort increases. The bound is 
simply the point where the quadratic benefit dominates the linear benefit. Note that the same 
argument holds when discussing 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 . We present the effort comparison in Figure 1 
(retailer-initiated RJV) and in Figure 2 (manufacturer-initiated RJV). We note that the thresholds 
Ψ𝑒𝑒2 and Ψ𝑒𝑒3 are functions of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽, and these two thresholds decrease in the impact of effort 
to the per-unit production cost (𝛽𝛽), meaning that regardless of which firm initiates collaboration, 
effort is likely to be larger when the government uses innovation subsidy than using per-unit 
subsidy when sustainability innovation is costly (𝑘𝑘 large). Moreover, for a retailer-initiated RJV, 
we note that as the marginal benefit in effort level to government’s objective function (𝛼𝛼 ) 
increases, both of the grey areas decrease. In addition, for any fixed value of 𝑘𝑘 , 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
always holds for larger values of 𝛽𝛽 than 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. The boundary between the two regions is 
decreasing in 𝛽𝛽  as 𝑘𝑘  increases. Similarly, when we consider 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 , we see that as 𝛼𝛼 




Figure 1: Comparison of 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
4.3. Profit Comparisons 
In this subsection, we compare the profits of the firms and the government under different 
systems. Specifically, Proposition 2 examines the impact of different types of subsidy 
(comparisons among systems 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃, 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼, and 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵), and then Proposition 3 studies the differences 
between retailer-initiated and manufacturer-initiated scenarios (comparisons between systems 𝑅𝑅𝑥𝑥 











𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 













𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 





collaboration, and 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑃𝑃, 𝐼𝐼,𝐵𝐵} denotes whether the government provides a Per-unit Production 
subsidy, an Innovation effort subsidy or Both types of subsidy. 
 
Proposition 2:  
The profit of the manufacturer is greatest under the per-unit subsidy, followed by when both 
subsidies are present, and least when only innovation effort subsidy is present, regardless of how 
the RJV is formed. Formally we write: 
a. 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅. 
The similar result holds for the retailer when it initiates the RJV, and retailer’s profits are all 
equal when the manufacturer initiates the RJV. Formally we write: 
b. 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅; 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 . 
The government profit is greatest when both subsidies are present, and only in certain cases, 
Ψ𝑥𝑥2 > 0, may we determine if the government prefers per-unit subsidy over innovation effort 
subsidy.  Formally we write: 
c. 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > max[𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ,𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅] and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ⟺ Ψx2 > 0. 
Where 𝛹𝛹𝑀𝑀2 and 𝛹𝛹𝑅𝑅2 is defined in the proof. 
First, regardless of which firm initiate the innovation project, Proposition 2a shows that 
the manufacturer is always better off when the government provides a per-unit subsidy. On the 
other hand, the manufacturer is worse off when the government provides a subsidy for 
innovation. When the government provides both types of subsidy, then the manufacturer’s profit 
is between the two cases where the government only provides a single type of subsidy. This is 
because when the retailer initiates the RJV, the manufacturer would have the largest subsidy 
level when the government provides per-unit tax credit for each produced unit, and would have 
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the smallest subsidy fraction when the government encourages innovation by subsidizing the cost 
of innovation (cf. Proposition 1b). With a larger subsidy level, the manufacturer thus has more 
profit under case RP than under case RI. On the other hand, when the manufacturer initiates the 
RJV, the effect on the manufacturer’s profit from the innovation cost dominates the effect from 
subsidy.  Specifically, the manufacturer would share the smallest amount of innovation cost 
when the government provides per-unit subsidy, but it is responsible for the largest share of 
innovation cost when the government subsidizes innovation (cf. Proposition 1c). As a result, the 
manufacturer has more profit under case MP than under case MI because of this impact from the 
innovation cost. 
Even though the follower covers the smallest fraction of the cost when the government 
uses innovation subsidy as compared to when the government uses other forms of subsidy (cf. 
Proposition 1), both firms are always (weakly) worse off under system 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼 regardless of which 
firm initiates the collaboration. Proposition 2b shows that the retailer is indifferent between 
government’s subsidy policies whenever the manufacturer initiates sustainability innovation. 
This is because the manufacturer would set the collaboration level 𝜆𝜆  without violating the 
retailer’s participation constraint (𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 ≥ 0), and we show in the derivation of the equilibrium 
solution (cf. Appendix A) that the retailer’s participation constraint is always binding. As a 
result, the retailer always has zero profit whenever the manufacturer initiates sustainability 
innovation, so the retailer is indifferent to the government’s subsidy policies. 
When the government uses a single type of subsidy (system 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃 or 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼), it is better off 
using the per-unit tax subsidy when ΨR2 > 0, if the retailer initiates collaboration, or when 
Ψ𝑀𝑀2 > 0, if the manufacturer initiates collaboration. Note that ΨR2 is obtained from comparing 
between 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅; similarly, ΨM2 is obtained from comparing between 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅. These 
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two thresholds are a function of all model parameter values: the base innovation effort cost (𝑘𝑘), 
the marginal benefit in effort level to government’s objective function (𝛼𝛼) and the impact of 
effort to the per-unit production cost (𝛽𝛽). Moreover, the solution to ΨR2 = 0 and the solution to 
ΨM2 = 0 are a function of 𝑘𝑘 is a non-monotonic function in 𝛽𝛽, such that it decreases in 𝑘𝑘 when 
innovation is cheap, and increases in 𝑘𝑘 when innovation is costly. 
We capture this tradeoff in Figure 3, using a coloring scheme analogous to Figures 1 and 
2. As in the left diagrams of Figures 3 and 4 (government benefit from innovation, 𝛼𝛼, is small), 
the condition Ψx2 > 0, 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑀𝑀,𝑅𝑅} is satisfied when per-unit production cost, 𝛽𝛽, is large and the 
base innovation cost, 𝑘𝑘 , is small. However, when the government can benefit more from 
innovation (𝛼𝛼 is large), the impact of base innovation cost, 𝑘𝑘, diminishes (the marginal change in 
𝛹𝛹𝑥𝑥2  with respect to 𝑘𝑘  decreases, i.e., the line 𝛹𝛹𝑥𝑥2 = 0  above which 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 , 𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑅𝑅,𝑀𝑀} , 
below which 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 ). Furthermore, regardless of the impact of innovation on production 
cost, recall from Propositions 2b,c that using a single type of subsidy always results in a more 
extreme collaboration level, in which the RJV follower is responsible for a larger (smaller) 
fraction of the cost/subsidy when the government uses per-unit production (innovation effort) 
subsidy relative to when both types of subsidy are present. The government benefits most from 
using both types of subsidy (system 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵 ) as it has more flexibility in manipulating the 
collaboration level by carefully selecting both forms of subsidy, 𝑡𝑡  and Δ𝑘𝑘 . Therefore, the 
government should use both types of subsidy whenever possible, regardless of the collaboration 
dynamics (cf. Proposition 2c). However, both firms are (weakly) worse off, so using both types 




Figure 3: Comparison of 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
Figure 4: Comparison of 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
Proposition 3:  
The profit of the manufacturer is greatest when it initiates the RJV, relative to when the retailer 
initiates the RJV except for the case when per-unit subsidy is present along with a mild feasibility 
condition, Ψ2 < 0. Formally we write: 
a. 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ⟺ Ψ2 < 0; 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅; 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅. 
 The retailer is always better off initiating the RJV, when compared to the manufacturer 











𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 












𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 







The government prefers to have a retailer initiated RJV when only per-unit subsidy is present 
and the innovation cost is sufficiently small, 𝑘𝑘 < Ψ3, or the marginal benefit of innovation effort 
and increase in per-unit product cost are sufficiently small, 4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1. The government is 
indifferent to the RJV formation dynamics when either only innovation effort subsidy or both 
subsidies is present.  Formally, we write : 
c. 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 < 1 𝑂𝑂𝑅𝑅 𝑘𝑘 < Ψ3; 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅; 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅. 
Where 𝛹𝛹2 and 𝛹𝛹3 are defined in the proof. 
One might expect that a firm is always better off being the RJV initiator because it has a 
first-mover advantage in deciding the fraction of cost/subsidy for which it is responsible. This is 
exactly the case for the retailer as depicted in Proposition 3b since when the manufacturer is the 
first-mover, it controls both effort and share levels thus leaves zero profit to the retailer, i.e., 
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 0. Yet Proposition 3a demonstrates that such intuition may not hold in some cases. In 
particular, when the government uses per-unit tax subsidy alone (system 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃), the manufacturer 
may be worse off being the RJV initiator (first mover) if Ψ2 < 0, depicted in the light grey area in 
Figure 5. Note that the threshold 𝛹𝛹2  is simply a multiplier of the difference between the 
manufacturer’s profit when the retailer initiates RJV (case RP) and when the manufacturer 
initiates RJV (case MP) for the situation where the government provides per-unit tax credit.  
Given that the profit functions 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 are functions of the innovation effort cost (𝑘𝑘), the 
marginal benefit in effort level (𝛼𝛼) and the impact of effort to production cost (𝛽𝛽), the threshold 
𝛹𝛹2 is also a function of these three parameters.  The negativity condition, Ψ2 < 0, is likely to 
hold when the base innovation cost, 𝑘𝑘, or the post-innovation per-unit production cost change, 𝛽𝛽, 
is sufficiently small. This follows from the fact that the per-unit tax credit subsidy is much larger 
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when the retailer initiates (𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ≫ 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅), leading to a larger sustainability innovation effort, so the 
demand is larger when the retailer initiates (𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅). Further, the manufacturer receives a 
larger fraction of the per-unit tax credit, despite covering a larger fraction of the innovation cost 
(𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅). As a result, the manufacturer is better off being the follower in the supply chain 
relationship.  
 
Figure 5: Comparison of 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
Note that the government is also better off with a retailer-initiated RJV when the base 
innovation cost, 𝑘𝑘 , or the post-innovation per-unit production cost change, 𝛽𝛽 , is sufficiently 
small (𝑘𝑘 < Ψ3), as presented in Figure 6.  We note that the threshold Ψ3 is a function of 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽, 
and it decreases in the impact of effort to the per-unit production cost (𝛽𝛽). As a result, the 
government is more likely better off if the manufacturer initiates collaboration when the 
government uses per-unit subsidy and when sustainability innovation is costly ( 𝑘𝑘  large). 
Moreover, the ranges of 𝑘𝑘 and 𝛽𝛽 that result in the government preferring a retailer-initiated RJV 
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Figure 6: Comparison of 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
Even though the innovation subsidy, Δ𝑘𝑘 , depends on which firm initiates the RJV 
collaboration (cf. Proposition B1b), the government is agnostic about the collaboration dynamics 
when it provides innovation subsidy (systems 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼 and 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵). This is because the optimal levels of 
innovation effort and price are independent of which firm initiates the collaboration, so demand 
(and hence, customer surplus) is the same (𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 and 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅). Moreover, the profit of 
the entire supply chain is similar, differing only by ( 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 −  𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅)(𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅)2 between the two 
collaboration dynamics despite the fact that each individual firm’s profit depends on which firm 
initiates collaboration. As a result, the government is indifferent to the collaboration dynamics 
when it provides innovation subsidy. 
We note that the game sequence of our main model does not include the kind of subsidy 
the government should provide. However, given the ranking of the government’s objective 
function in Propositions 2 and 3, it suggests that whenever the R&D effort increases per-unit 
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5. Managerial Insights and Future Research Directions 
In this paper, we present a sustainable supply chain model that considers government subsidy, 
RJV formation dynamics, innovation effort, and pricing decisions. To our knowledge, this is the 
first work in the OM literature to consider all four decisions in one model. The theoretical 
contribution of our paper is as follows. Our paper extends the literature of sustainability that 
studies social welfare and regulation by considering subsidy for both upfront innovation cost and 
post-innovation per-unit production cost. Moreover, our paper differs from the stream of 
literature that examines the area of collaboration innovation by investigating how government 
policy influences the collaborative innovation between these two supply chain entities. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first model that jointly considers (1) innovation and production 
subsidies, and (2) two types of supply chain collaboration (manufacturer initiates innovation and 
retailer initiates innovation).  This helps to address two of the four research gaps, the largely 
ignored market forces and vertically aligned sustainable strategies, identified by Tang and Zhou 
(2012).  The following section summarizes the insights that managers may glean from this study, 
as well as our recommendations for future research.  
 
5.1. Managerial Insights 
As discussed in the introduction, our work is motivated by governments’ push for sustainability 
via their industries and policies and executives desire to collaborate in sustainable innovation 
(Kiron et al., 2015; Rossini et al., 2016). The first key message of our paper is that the 
government should never use both types of subsidies simultaneously for any cost-reduction R&D 
effort. We are beginning to see this in the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
reform as it shifts from both product-based and producer-based subsidies to producer 
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support/subsidies (European Commission, 2013) (i.e., from something akin to having both 
subsidies present to only innovation subsidies in our paper). Another insight that government 
policy makers may take away from our results (and from Proposition 3 in particular) is that 
regardless of how an industrial sector decides to develop sustainable products or how RJVs are 
formed, so long as cost-increasing R&D effort is present, the government is indifferent to how 
the RJV is formed as long as innovation effort subsidy is present. We see that certain 
governments have already embraced this approach, as in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (US Congress & U.S. Congress, 2009) and Innovate UK, which provide 
subsidy for sustainability efforts. On the other hand, when the government only uses per-unit 
subsidy, then a retailer-initiated RJV is preferable when innovation is not too costly. We realize 
that most government incentive policies provide multipronged subsidy; however, for smaller, 
potentially budget-constrained governments, ensuring that effort subsidy is present is one key 
takeaway from our work. 
Another group that may benefit from our work is company leaders looking to respond to 
government incentive programs by undertaking research in RJVs. For instance, when Walmart 
collaborated with its suppliers (such as Clorox) to create smaller bleach bottles, it initiated RJVs 
as part of a sustainability program. However, when government subsidy is present, it is unclear 
which party should initiate the venture. A myopic view of this issue would be to assume that in 
all circumstances, the initiating party has first-mover advantage. As noted in Proposition 3, a 
manufacturer should not initiate the RJV when only per-unit government subsidy is present, the 
innovation cost is sufficiently small, and the post-innovation increase in per-unit cost is small. 
Even though the manufacturer is better off not initiating the venture, it covers more of the RJV 
cost by not initiating the RJV than by initiating it (Proposition 1). 
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Finally, many industries have lobbyists to help present their views to government 
organizations; for example, Walmart has various firms lobbying on its behalf (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2015). These lobbyists may request that governments provide subsidy in 
order to help firms satisfy various government policies or initiatives. One insight that lobbyists 
may glean from our analysis is that the supply chain partners are better off when only per-unit 
government subsidy is present (Proposition 2). However, if effort subsidy is present, the supply 
chain partners are better off having per-unit subsidy present as well, as governments are better 
off using both forms of subsidy. 
These are compelling insights not only for policy makers, but also for industry leaders. 
This is a much needed first step in sustainable supply chain research, and there are numerous 
possible directions for future study. 
 
5.2. Future Research Directions 
The first natural extension to the model presented here is to consider different bargaining 
strengths among the supply chain partners. In this paper, we assume that the initiating partner 
(either manufacturer or retailer) holds all of the bargaining power in the relationship. We have 
performed preliminary analysis considering the case where both firms have equal bargaining 
power. Based on the optimal solution under the bargaining game, we examine the impact on our 
results when the manufacturer and the retailer have the same bargaining power. Our objective is 
to compare different government subsidies under the bargaining game (The results are available 
from the authors upon request).  Our extension shows that when two firms have equal bargaining 
power, the innovation-only subsidy leads to the lowest collaboration level in retailer-initiated (cf. 
Proposition 1b) and the highest collaboration level in manufacturer-initiated (cf. Proposition 1c). 
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Moreover, we find that the sustainability effort is higher when providing both forms of subsidies 
than simply providing innovation subsidy. The insight from the comparison of the effort level for 
per-unit subsidy and for innovation subsidy continues to hold when the two firms have equal 
power. The rankings of the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s profit are the same as the 
retailer-initiated and the manufacturer-initiated scenarios. In terms of the ranking of the 
government’s profit. Similar to our findings in Proposition 2c, we find that the government is 
always better off when providing both types of subsidies than providing innovation subsidy. 
Lastly, the comparison between government’s profit when providing a single type of subsidy is 
not affected when the two firms have equal bargaining power. With that being said, it would be 
interesting to consider a complete analysis about how the firms and government are affected as a 
function of various possible bargaining power. A second extension of this model is to consider a 
temporal component. As discussed in the introduction, there are multiple forms of government 
subsidy available. Two forms of subsidy are tax subsidy (given directly to the innovating firm(s)) 
and tax (usually import) on competing firms. In both cases, the government is trading future 
gains for current gains, and incorporating these tradeoffs into a sustainable supply chain model 
could be of interest. Lastly, in the subsidy considered here, we assume no competition from other 
governments as well as no competition to the supply chain partners. In actuality, competition 
exists not only from other governments but also from other supply chain partners; for example, 
GM and its dealership network and Ford and its dealership network directly compete with each 




Appendix A: Derivation of Equilibrium 
We start by analyzing two general cases: the retailer-initiated collaboration with both types of 
subsidy (RB), and the manufacturer-initiated collaboration with both types of subsidy (MB). For 
the ease of analysis and presentation, we sometimes solve same player’s simultaneous decisions 
sequentially, e.g., solving w first then e (two joint decisions) in step 3 of the retailer initiated 
case. We do this to take advantage of some structural properties that facilitate the analysis but 
note that the final solutions are the same regardless of the order of how they are solved as long as 
it is the same decision maker. We then provide brief analysis and the equilibrium solutions of the 
other four cases (𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 , 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 , 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃 , and 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 ), following the same backward induction solution 
procedure. To focus on the non-trivial region where efforts are positive, for this paper, we only 
consider the region where 𝛽𝛽 < 1 . Otherwise, the optimal solution shows that the per-unit 
increase in production cost due to sustainability innovation is too high and the firms would never 
innovate. 
 
Retailer-Initiated Collaboration with Both Types of Subsidy (RB) 
Pricing decisions (𝑝𝑝 and 𝑤𝑤): First, in Step 4 of the game sequence, since 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 is concave in 𝑝𝑝, 
solving the first-order optimality condition (FOC) for 𝑝𝑝 , 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 , yields the optimal retail 
price,  𝑝𝑝∗(𝑤𝑤, 𝑒𝑒, 𝜆𝜆, 𝑡𝑡,Δ𝑘𝑘) . (Note that for ease of presentation, we suppress some or all of the 
arguments unless confusion may arise.) In Step 3, 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀  is concave in 𝑤𝑤  and solving the FOC 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 gives: 
𝑤𝑤∗(𝑒𝑒, 𝜆𝜆) = 1+(1+𝛽𝛽)𝑒𝑒+𝑡𝑡(1−2𝜆𝜆)
2
 and 𝑝𝑝∗(𝑒𝑒) = 3+(3+𝛽𝛽)𝑒𝑒−𝑡𝑡
4
.  
The wholesale price, 𝑤𝑤 , is increasing as either the production cost, 𝛽𝛽 , or effort, 𝑒𝑒 , 
increase, and is decreasing as the Manufacturer’s RJV share, 𝜆𝜆, increases. The effect of per-unit 
production subsidy, 𝑡𝑡, on 𝑤𝑤 depends on 𝜆𝜆. When the manufacturer receives more (or less) than 
half of the unit subsidy, it reduces (or increases) its price charged to the retailer. We continue 
32 
 
with the process to find 𝑒𝑒∗(𝜆𝜆). Substituting 𝑝𝑝∗(𝑒𝑒) and 𝑤𝑤∗(𝑒𝑒, 𝜆𝜆) into 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀  and solving for 𝑒𝑒  in 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒




Innovation RJV decisions ( 𝜆𝜆 ): In Step 2 the retailer decides the collaboration level, 𝜆𝜆 . 
Substituting 𝑒𝑒∗(𝜆𝜆) into 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 and solving for the FOC 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0 gives: 
𝜆𝜆∗(Δ𝑘𝑘) = 1 − (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)
 .  
Note that the share level, 𝜆𝜆,  only depends on innovation subsidy, Δ𝑘𝑘 , but not on 
production subsidy, 𝑡𝑡 . In particular, the retailer will increase its share (1 − 𝜆𝜆)  for smaller 
production cost increases or lower net innovation cost  (𝑘𝑘 − Δ𝑘𝑘) . Given the equilibrium 
collaboration level, we rewrite the manufacturer’s effort level as: 𝑒𝑒∗(𝑡𝑡,Δ𝑘𝑘) = (1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
8(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)−32(1−𝛽𝛽)
2. 
From the equilibrium effort decision, we note that effort level depends on both subsidies. Though 
collaboration does raise innovation effort level (for any given subsidy, from 𝑒𝑒∗|𝜆𝜆=1 =
(1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
8(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
 with no collaboration to 𝑒𝑒∗|𝜆𝜆=𝜆𝜆∗ =
(1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
8(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)−32(1−𝛽𝛽)
2  with collaboration), 
collaboration helps more for small production cost increases (small 𝛽𝛽) as the retailer strategically 
shares less as production cost increases.  
Government subsidy decisions (𝑡𝑡 and Δ𝑘𝑘): Lastly, in Step 1, substituting all of the above optimal 
decision variables into 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺  and solving the two FOCs (
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕Δ𝑘𝑘
= 0) simultaneously for 𝑡𝑡 
and Δ𝑘𝑘 give the optimal solutions: 
𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 3[2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)]
2𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)2






















In equilibrium, together positive retail price 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽(𝛼𝛼+1−𝛽𝛽)
2𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
 and effort 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝛼𝛼+1−𝛽𝛽
2𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
 
require 𝛽𝛽 > 0 and 𝑘𝑘 > (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
2
. In addition, second-order optimality condition requires 𝛽𝛽 < 1 to 
ensure that we are finding global maxima when deriving equilibrium decisions. We note that 
boundary solutions in the general case reduce to special cases that are analyzed separately (in the 
appendix as the solving procedures are similar for RI and RP), e.g., RP is RB with Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0 and 
RI is RB with 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0. This implies that for cost-reducing (negative) 𝛽𝛽 and thus a negative retail 
price, the government would never use both subsidies simultaneously. For ease of exposition in 
the main text, we present and discuss only interior solutions that satisfy joint technical conditions 
for all cases, in particular, 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. However, using the conditions on the non-negativity of 
other decision variables (e.g., Δ𝑘𝑘, 𝑒𝑒,𝑝𝑝, 𝜆𝜆) one may show that the range of 𝛽𝛽 range may be relaxed 
under special cases. When all technical conditions are met, all three parties’ profits are increasing 
in 𝛼𝛼, suggesting that sustainability innovation can be a win-win strategy for both the government 
(society) and supply chain partners, if the government (society) benefits significantly from 
sustainable business practices.  
 
Manufacturer-Initiated Collaboration with Both Types of Subsidy (MB) 
Pricing decisions (𝑝𝑝 and 𝑤𝑤): Same as in the 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 case. 
Innovation effort and RJV decisions (𝑒𝑒 and 𝜆𝜆): In Step 2, with 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝∗(𝑒𝑒) and 𝑤𝑤 = 𝑤𝑤∗(𝑒𝑒, 𝜆𝜆), 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 
is decreasing in 𝜆𝜆 while 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 is increasing in 𝜆𝜆 for any given innovation effort level, 𝑒𝑒. This means 
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that the manufacturer will reduce 𝜆𝜆  until  𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0 , the retailer’s outside option, to satisfy 




= 0 yields: 
𝜆𝜆∗(Δ𝑘𝑘) = 1 − 16(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)
9(1−𝛽𝛽)2
 and 𝑒𝑒∗(𝑡𝑡,Δ𝑘𝑘) = 3(1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
16(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)−3(1−𝛽𝛽)2
 .  
Note that 𝜆𝜆∗(Δ𝑘𝑘) may be negative, meaning that on the one hand, the manufacturer would 
receive money from the retailer, and the amount of money received is a function of the 
innovation level. This money transaction may occur during the product development phase, and 
so it can be interpreted as the scenario where the retailer provides a short-term loan to the 
manufacturer to cover the innovation cost. On the other hand, the manufacturer also needs to pay 
money to the retailer, and this amount is a function of the government's subsidy. One realistic 
scenario is that this transaction happens after demand is realized and the manufacturer pays back 
the short term loan that it receives from the retailer during the product development phase. 
 
Government subsidy decisions (𝑡𝑡 and Δ𝑘𝑘): Lastly, in Step 1, as in the 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵 case, solving the two 
FOCs, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
= 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕Δ𝑘𝑘
= 0, simultaneously gives the optimal solutions: 
𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 3[2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)]
2𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
















Since the equilibrium retail price is the same and technical conditions are similar as in the RB 
case, we omit their interpretations for this case but note that we compare and discuss results 
across all six cases next. 
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System RP: For notation convenience, define Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 256𝑘𝑘2 − 160𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 + 17(1 − 𝛽𝛽)4 . 
First, note that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 is concave in 𝑝𝑝, so we solve 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 for the optimal 𝑝𝑝. Second, 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 is concave 
in 𝑤𝑤 , and we solve 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0  for the optimal 𝑤𝑤 . Solving for the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0  gives 𝑒𝑒 =
(1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
8𝑘𝑘𝜆𝜆−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
. Similarly, solving the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0  gives 𝜆𝜆 = 1 − (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16𝑘𝑘
. Lastly, solving for the 
FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
















2 , and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺 =
(16𝑘𝑘+(8𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽−1)(1−𝛽𝛽))2
2Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
. Note that at 

















. It can be shown that 16𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > 3(1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16
, Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺
𝑘𝑘 > 5+2√2
16
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑘𝑘 < 5−2√2
16
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 , and 5+2√2
16





(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 , so 
all SOCs are satisfied if and only if 𝑘𝑘 > 5+2√2
16
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2. 
System RI: For notation convenience, define Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 32𝑘𝑘 − 7(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 . First, note that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅  is 
concave in 𝑝𝑝, so we solve 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 for the optimal 𝑝𝑝. Second, 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 is concave in 𝑤𝑤, and we solve 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 for the optimal 𝑤𝑤. Solving for the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0 gives 𝑒𝑒 = (1−𝛽𝛽)
8(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)𝜆𝜆−(1−𝛽𝛽)2
. Similarly, 
solving the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆
= 0  gives 𝜆𝜆 = 1 − (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)
. Lastly, solving for the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡




, 𝑒𝑒 = 16𝛼𝛼+7(1−𝛽𝛽)
Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅








, and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺 =
7𝑘𝑘+7𝛼𝛼+8𝛼𝛼2−7𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽
Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅


















3 . It can be shown that Γ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 >
7(1−𝛽𝛽)2
32
, so all SOCs are satisfied if and 




System MP: For notation convenience, define Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 8𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 . First, note that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅  is 
concave in 𝑝𝑝, so we solve 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕















= −4𝑒𝑒2𝑘𝑘2 < 0, so this is a saddle 
point. Since 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 decreases in 𝜆𝜆 and 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 increases in 𝜆𝜆, M would set the smallest 𝜆𝜆, such that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 =
0. Then solving for the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0 gives 𝑒𝑒 = 3(1+𝑡𝑡)(1−𝛽𝛽)
16𝑘𝑘−3(1−𝛽𝛽)2
. Lastly, solving for the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
=
0  gives 𝑡𝑡 = 3(16𝑘𝑘
2+2𝑘𝑘(1−𝛽𝛽)(8𝛼𝛼−1+𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)3)
2𝑘𝑘Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅
, 𝑒𝑒 = 3(1−𝛽𝛽)(4𝑘𝑘+3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽))
2𝑘𝑘Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅





2 , 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0, and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺 =
(4𝑘𝑘+3𝛼𝛼−3𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)2
4𝑘𝑘Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅











. It can be shown that 16𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 >
0 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > 3(1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16









, so all SOCs are satisfied if 




System MI: For notation convenience, define Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 32𝑘𝑘 − 7(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 . First, note that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅  is 
concave in 𝑝𝑝, so we solve 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
= 0 for the optimal 𝑝𝑝. Second, 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 is concave in 𝑤𝑤, and we solve 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕










= −4𝑒𝑒2(𝑘𝑘 − Δ𝑘𝑘)2 < 0, so this is a 
saddle point. Since 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 decreases in 𝜆𝜆 and 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 increases in 𝜆𝜆, M would set the smallest 𝜆𝜆, such 
that 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0. Then solving for the FOC 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
= 0 gives 𝑒𝑒 = 3(1−𝛽𝛽)
16(𝑘𝑘−Δ𝑘𝑘)−3(1−𝛽𝛽)2
. Lastly, solving for 
the FOC 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝜕𝜕Δ𝑘𝑘
= 0  gives Δ𝑘𝑘 = 𝑘𝑘(16𝛼𝛼+1−𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)
2
16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽
, 𝑒𝑒 = 16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽
Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅






, 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 = 0, and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺 =
7𝑘𝑘+7𝛼𝛼+8𝛼𝛼2−7𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽
Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅












3 . It can be shown that Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 >
7(1−𝛽𝛽)2
32
, so all 





Appendix B: Subsidy Parameters 
In this appendix, we examine the impact of different types of subsidy on a given supply chain 
structure (comparisons between systems 𝑥𝑥𝑃𝑃, 𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼, and 𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵). Proposition B1 examines these impacts 
to the subsidy parameters, 𝑡𝑡 and Δ𝑘𝑘. 
Proposition B1:  
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The optimal per-unit production subsidy by the government is always greatest when only per-
unit subsidy is offered, than when any other form of subsidy is offered. In addition, there exists a 
threshold, Ψ1 , on the effort cost, 𝑘𝑘 , above which the per-unit government subsidy in the 
manufacturer initiated RJV is higher than the retailer initiated RJV. Formally we write: 
a. 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  ; 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > 𝛹𝛹1  
Similarly, the innovation effort subsidy, Δ𝑘𝑘, is greatest when only it is present as opposed to 
when both subsidies are present. In addition, the innovation effort subsidy is greatest under the 
retailer initiated RJV dynamics, regardless if per-unit production subsidy is present or not. 
Formally we write: 
b. 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅. 
Where 𝛹𝛹1 is defined in the proof. 
The government would always provide a higher per-unit subsidy when it only subsidizes 
through per-unit production than when it subsidizes through both per-unit production and 
innovation cost (i.e., txP > txB). This is because the government can spread the subsidy when 
utilizing both forms of subsidy, while it focuses all subsidy into per-unit production when it only 
uses a single type of subsidy. 
Moreover, innovation subsidy is always larger when the retailer initiates a RJV (𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 >
𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅). In contrast, the tax credit parameter is (weakly) larger when the manufacturer initiates 
(𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ≥ 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅) for costly innovation (𝑘𝑘 > 𝛹𝛹1). This is because when innovation is not costly (𝑘𝑘 is 
small), the fraction of cost/subsidy (𝜆𝜆 ) that the manufacturer is responsible for would be 
relatively invariant to whether the collaboration is initiated by the manufacturer or by the retailer. 
However, as shown in Lemma 1b, when innovation becomes more costly, the collaboration level 
increases when the retailer initiates collaboration, while the collaboration level decreases 
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otherwise. As a result, when innovation is costly (𝑘𝑘 is large), the manufacturer’s collaboration 
level would be much larger (𝜆𝜆 large) if the project is initiated by the retailer than if it is initiated 
by the manufacturer. Then the government would encourage more demand by increasing the per-
unit tax subsidy, 𝑡𝑡, when the manufacturer initiates the RJV because the retailer has a high level 
of involvement and would set a retail price that best aligns with the government’s incentive. Note 
that the value of 𝛹𝛹1 is a function of the marginal benefit in effort level to government’s objective 
function (𝛼𝛼) and the impact of effort to the per-unit production cost (𝛽𝛽). Ψ1  decreases in 𝛽𝛽 
implying that the per-unit tax subsidy under system MP is larger than that under system RP, 
when sustainability innovation is costly (𝑘𝑘 large). 
As such, the relationship between different values of 𝑡𝑡 may not be intuitively clear. In 
Figure 7, we visualize the relationship between different 𝑡𝑡 values, and show how 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
change with the model parameters when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 or 𝛼𝛼 = 1. The all-white region is the infeasible 
region where the problem is ill defined—that is, SOC conditions or individual rationality is not 
satisfied for the supply chain partners. For any fixed value of 𝑘𝑘 , the light grey region (the 
scenario where 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅) is always below the dark grey region (𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅), implying that for 
small per-unit cost increase, the tax credit parameter is larger when the retailer initiates the 




Figure 7: Comparison of 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 and 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 (left) and when 𝛼𝛼 = 1 (right) 
 
For any given supply chain RJV structure, Proposition B1b shows that the subsidy 
parameter is always smaller when the government uses both kinds of subsidy than when it only 
uses one type of subsidy (𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 and 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅). This is because when the government 
uses two different forms of subsidy, it can better incentivize the firms to collaborate and innovate 
at the desired level.  
Appendix C: Proof of Propositions 



































Proof of Lemma 1: 
















𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 


















2 . Note that the 
discriminant of the numerator’s quadratic polynomial as a function of 𝑘𝑘  is −8192(1 −
𝛽𝛽)4(8𝛼𝛼2 + 8𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) < 0. Therefore, there is no root to 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘




never change sign. Consequently, it can easily be shown that 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
< 0 . We use a similar 
technique to show that 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘
< 0, and the details are omitted to avoid redundancy. Lastly, note 












, where Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 2048(3 + 2𝛼𝛼 − 3𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘
3 − 256(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(7− 𝛼𝛼 − 7𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘2 −
8(1 − 𝛽𝛽)4(42𝛼𝛼 − 19 + 19𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘 + 51𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)6. We use the method proposed by Pun (2015) to 
show that Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 for all 𝛼𝛼 > 0, 𝑘𝑘 >
(1−𝛽𝛽)2
2
, and 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. Specifically, Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is a polynomial, 






= 0, and 
𝜕𝜕Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽
= 0, or at the boundary. Since there is no solution to these 
FOCs in the domain, the minimum of Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  is at the four boundaries. [Case 1 - 𝛼𝛼 = 0]: At this 
boundary, Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛼𝛼=0 = 6144𝑘𝑘3(1 − 𝛽𝛽) − 1792𝑘𝑘2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)3 + 152𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽)5 . There is no solution 








= 0  in the domain 𝑘𝑘 > (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
2
 and 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1 . Moreover, 
Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅




𝛼𝛼=0 = 0 when 𝛽𝛽 = 1, and Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛼𝛼=0 = 8𝑘𝑘(19 − 224𝑘𝑘 +
768𝑘𝑘2) when 𝛽𝛽 = 0, which can be shown to be positive. Since Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛼𝛼=0 > 0 when 𝑘𝑘 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 =
0.5 , Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛼𝛼=0 > 0  for all 𝑘𝑘 > (1−𝛽𝛽)
2
2







459𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)6 + 396(1 − 𝛽𝛽)7 > 0. [Case 3 - 𝛽𝛽 = 1]: Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛽𝛽=1 = 4096𝑘𝑘3𝛼𝛼 > 0. [Case 4 - 𝛽𝛽 = 0]: 
Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅









= 0  in the domain 𝑘𝑘 > 1
2
 and 𝛼𝛼 > 0 . Moreover, Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛽𝛽=0 = 9(44 +
41 
 
51𝛼𝛼)  when 𝑘𝑘 = 1
2
 and Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛽𝛽=0 = 8𝑘𝑘(19 − 224𝑘𝑘 + 768𝑘𝑘2) > 0  when 𝛼𝛼 = 0 , so Ψt𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝛽𝛽=0 > 0 . In 
conclusion, since there is no solution to the FOCs of ΨtRP  and ΨtRP > 0  at the boundaries, 
ΨtRP > 0 is true for all 𝛼𝛼 > 0 , 𝑘𝑘 >
(1−𝛽𝛽)2
2
, and 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. As a result, 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽
< 0. We use a 
similar technique to show that 𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅
𝜕𝜕𝛽𝛽
< 0, and the details are omitted to avoid redundancy. Lastly, 


































































































































2 . Using the method presented in Part a, 












































Proof of Proposition B1: 
Part a: (i) 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (1−𝛽𝛽)�16𝑘𝑘−5(1−𝛽𝛽)
2��16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼−(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)2�
ΓRPΓRB
> 0  because 16𝑘𝑘 > 5(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 
when 𝑘𝑘 > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2 and Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼 > (1 + 9𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2.  
(ii) 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 3(1−𝛽𝛽)�4𝑘𝑘−(1−𝛽𝛽)
2��2𝑘𝑘(2𝛼𝛼−1+𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)2�
2𝑘𝑘ΓMPΓMB
> 0 because 4𝑘𝑘 > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2  when 𝑘𝑘 >
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2 and Δ𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 2𝑘𝑘(2𝛼𝛼 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽) > 3𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2.  
(iii) Comparing the equilibrium solution shows that 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅. 
(iv) 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (1−𝛽𝛽)(16𝑘𝑘−3(1−𝛽𝛽)
2)Γ𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
2𝑘𝑘ΓRPΓMP
, where Γ𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 64(4𝛼𝛼 − 3 + 3𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘2 −
4(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(72𝛼𝛼 − 11 + 11𝛽𝛽)𝑘𝑘 + 51𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)4 . Note that 16𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0  when 𝑘𝑘 >
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2 . There are two solutions to Γ𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 0 , but the smaller root is smaller than 




To show that the solution space is not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 
𝑘𝑘 = 0.35 and 𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝑡𝑡𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.4. 
Part b: 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = (1−𝛽𝛽)ΓRI
16(16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽)
> 0 , 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
(1−𝛽𝛽)�16𝑘𝑘(1+10𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)+(1−𝛽𝛽)�96𝛼𝛼2+31𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)+7(1−𝛽𝛽)2��
16(16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽)(1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)
> 0 , 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝛥𝛥𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
(1−𝛽𝛽)�8𝑘𝑘+(1−𝛽𝛽)(3𝛼𝛼−1+𝛽𝛽)�
16(1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)
> 0 because 8𝑘𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(3𝛼𝛼 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽) > 0 when 𝑘𝑘 > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2. □ 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Part a:  
(i) 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = �16𝑘𝑘−3(1−𝛽𝛽)
2��16𝑘𝑘+3(1−𝛽𝛽)2�
144𝑘𝑘(1−𝛽𝛽)2
> 0 , 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
�32𝑘𝑘−7(1−𝛽𝛽)2��64𝑘𝑘+(80𝛼𝛼+21−21𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
3(1−𝛽𝛽)(16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽)�64𝑘𝑘+(48𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
> 0 , 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
�8𝑘𝑘+(1−𝛽𝛽)(3𝛼𝛼−1+𝛽𝛽)��16𝑘𝑘+(3+11𝛼𝛼−3𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
3(1−𝛽𝛽)(1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)�16𝑘𝑘+(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
> 0.  
(ii) 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
(1−𝛽𝛽)�16𝑘𝑘−3(1−𝛽𝛽)2�ΓeMP𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
2𝑘𝑘ΓRPΓMP
, where ΓeMP𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 64𝑘𝑘2 − 51𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)3 + 4𝑘𝑘(1 −
𝛽𝛽)(−13 + 20𝛼𝛼 + 13𝛽𝛽) . Note that 16𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0 when 𝑘𝑘 > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2. There are two 
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�−20𝛼𝛼 + 13(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + �169 + 296𝛼𝛼 + 400𝛼𝛼2 − 338𝛽𝛽 − 296𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 + 169𝛽𝛽2� . To 
show that the solution space is not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 
𝑘𝑘 = 0.15 and 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.2. 
Part b:  
(i) 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = (1−𝛽𝛽)�16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼−(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)
2�
16𝑘𝑘�16𝑘𝑘+(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
> 0  because Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼 > (1 + 9𝛼𝛼 −
𝛽𝛽)(1− 𝛽𝛽)2. 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 24(1−𝛽𝛽)(1+4𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)
�16𝑘𝑘+(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)��64𝑘𝑘+(7+48𝛼𝛼−7𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)�
> 0. 
(ii) 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = �16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼−(1+9𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)
2��16𝑘𝑘−9(1−𝛽𝛽)2�
ΓRPΓRB
> 0  because (a) Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼 −
(1 + 9𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0  and (b) Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 𝛼𝛼(16𝑘𝑘 − 9(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)3 ⇒ 16𝑘𝑘 −
9(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0 . 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 9(1−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)
ΓRIΓRB
> 0 . 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
256𝑘𝑘2(−9+16𝛼𝛼+9𝛽𝛽)−32𝑘𝑘(1−𝛽𝛽)2(−1+144𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)+9(7+80𝛼𝛼−7𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)4
ΓRPΓRI
. There are two roots to the 
numerators, but the smaller root is smaller than (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2 , so 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒2 =
144𝛼𝛼−(1−𝛽𝛽)+2√2�71+648𝛼𝛼+1152𝛼𝛼2−142𝛽𝛽−648𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+71𝛽𝛽2
16(−9+16𝛼𝛼+9𝛽𝛽)
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2. To show that the solution space is 
not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.2 and 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 =
0.5. 
Part c:  
(i) 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 4(4𝛼𝛼+1−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)
(16𝛼𝛼+7−7𝛽𝛽)(1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)(1−𝛽𝛽)
> 0 . 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜆𝜆𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 4(2𝑘𝑘(2𝛼𝛼−1+𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)
2)
9(1−𝛽𝛽)2(1+𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)
> 0 because 
Δ𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 2𝑘𝑘(2𝛼𝛼 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽) > 3𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2.  
(ii) 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = �4𝑘𝑘−3(1−𝛽𝛽)
2��2𝑘𝑘(−1+2𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)2�
2𝑘𝑘ΓMPΓMB
> 0  because (a) Δ𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺
2𝑘𝑘(−1 + 2𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) − 3𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0  and (b) Δ𝑘𝑘𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 𝛼𝛼(4𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) >
2𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽) ⇒ 4𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0 . 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 9(1−𝛽𝛽)(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)
ΓMIΓMB
> 0 . 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
16𝑘𝑘2(−17+16𝛼𝛼+17𝛽𝛽)−6𝑘𝑘(1−𝛽𝛽)2(−7+64𝛼𝛼+7𝛽𝛽)+63𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)4
2𝑘𝑘ΓMPΓMI
. There are two roots to the numerators, but the 
smaller root is smaller than (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2 , so 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 ⟺ 𝑘𝑘 > Ψ𝑒𝑒3 =
3(64𝛼𝛼−7(1−𝛽𝛽)+�49+1008𝛼𝛼+2304𝛼𝛼2−98𝛽𝛽−1008𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽+49𝛽𝛽2)
16(−17+16𝛼𝛼+17𝛽𝛽)
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2. To show that the solution space is 
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not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.5 and 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝑒𝑒𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  when 
𝑘𝑘 = 0.8. □ 
Proof of Proposition 2: 







2 , where Ψ𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 8192𝑘𝑘
4 + 512𝑘𝑘3(1 −
𝛽𝛽)(−11 + 8𝛼𝛼 + 11𝛽𝛽) − 32𝑘𝑘2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)3(−19 + 88𝛼𝛼 + 19𝛽𝛽) + 2𝑘𝑘(55 + 184𝛼𝛼 − 55𝛽𝛽)(1 −
𝛽𝛽)5 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)7(−12 + 11𝛼𝛼 + 12𝛽𝛽). Using the logic presented in the proof of Lemma 1a(ii), it 
can be shown that Ψ𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 . Therefore, 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  because Δ𝑘𝑘𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 0 ⟺ 16𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼 −
(1 + 9𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0. We use the same technique to show the remaining inequalities for 
Parts a and b. 




> 0, 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
9(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)2
2ΓRIΓRB
> 0, 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
(2𝑘𝑘(−1+2𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)−3𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)2)2
4𝑘𝑘ΓMPΓMB
> 0 , 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
9(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)2
2ΓMIΓMB




ΨR2 = 4608𝑘𝑘3 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)4(720𝛼𝛼2 + 126𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 7(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) + 2𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(2304𝛼𝛼2 −
32𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 9(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) − 64𝑘𝑘2(64𝛼𝛼2 − 72𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 9(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) . This can either be 
positive or negative. Similarly, 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
ΨM2
2Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅Γ𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅
, where ΨM2 = 288𝑘𝑘3 − 63𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)4 +
12𝑘𝑘𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(−7 + 32𝛼𝛼 + 7𝛽𝛽) − 4𝑘𝑘2(64𝛼𝛼2 − 136𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 7(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2). This can either be 
positive or negative. To show that the solution space is not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝑘𝑘 =
0.2, then 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 when 𝛽𝛽 = 0.5 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 when 𝛽𝛽 = 0.8. □ 
Proof of Proposition 3: 




2 , where Ψ2 = 65536𝑘𝑘5 + 4096𝑘𝑘4(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(40𝛼𝛼 −
27(1 − 𝛽𝛽)) + 256𝑘𝑘3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2(304𝛼𝛼2 − 872𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 171(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) − 16𝑘𝑘2(1 −
𝛽𝛽)4(6064𝛼𝛼2 − 5080𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 217(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) + 24𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽)6(1398𝛼𝛼2 − 273𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) −
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) − 2601𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)8. Note that Ψ2 can either be positive or negative. To show that the 
solution space is not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.17 and 
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅  when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.22 . (ii) 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽
ΓMI
> 0 , (iii) 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 − 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =
(2𝑘𝑘+𝛼𝛼−𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽)�8𝑘𝑘+(1−𝛽𝛽)(−1+3𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)�
4ΓMB
2 > 0  because 8𝑘𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(3𝛼𝛼 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽) > 0  when 𝑘𝑘 >
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2. 
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Part b: This is true because 𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅
𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 0. 






, where Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 32𝑘𝑘
2(4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1) +
2𝑘𝑘(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(40𝛼𝛼2 − 52𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽) − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2) − 51𝛼𝛼2(1 − 𝛽𝛽)3. Note that 16𝑘𝑘 − 3(1 − 𝛽𝛽)2 > 0 
when 𝑘𝑘 > (1 − 𝛽𝛽)2/2. We next show the condition for Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 0. First, there are two roots 
to Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 0  when 4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1 > 0 , but only the larger root Ψ3 =
(1−𝛽𝛽)�−40𝛼𝛼2+52𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)+(1−𝛽𝛽)2+�1600𝛼𝛼4+2368𝛼𝛼3(1−𝛽𝛽)+992𝛼𝛼2(1−𝛽𝛽)2+104𝛼𝛼(1−𝛽𝛽)3+(1−𝛽𝛽)4�
32(−1+4𝛼𝛼+𝛽𝛽)
 is positive. 
Second, when 4𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 − 1 < 0 , Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 0  when 𝑘𝑘 =
(1−𝛽𝛽)2
2
. Moreover, the maximum of 
Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  is at 𝑘𝑘 =
−(1−𝛽𝛽)Ψ𝑥𝑥
32(1−4𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽)
, where Ψ𝑥𝑥 = 1 + 52𝛼𝛼 − 40𝛼𝛼2 − 2𝛽𝛽 − 52𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 + 𝛽𝛽2 . Using the 
method presented in the proof of Lemma 1a(ii), it can be shown that Ψ𝑥𝑥 > 0 for all 𝛼𝛼 > 0 and 
0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1 − 4𝛼𝛼. Therefore, Ψ𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 0, so 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅. To show that the solution space is 
not empty, note that if 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽 = 1
2
, then 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 < 𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 𝑘𝑘 = 0.17 and 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 > 𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 when 
𝑘𝑘 = 0.22. (ii-iii) The result can be obtained by comparing the equilibrium solution. □ 
 
Appendix D: Notation 
Term Meaning 
𝑝𝑝 Product price, set by the retailer 
𝑒𝑒 Sustainability effort exerted by the manufacturer 
𝐷𝐷 Demand for the product 
𝑘𝑘 The coefficient of effort cost, quadratic in effort (total cost is 𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2) 
𝑐𝑐 Per-unit production cost 
𝛽𝛽 The change in production cost as a result of sustainability effort, 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1. 
𝑡𝑡 Per-unit tax credit for each produced unit 
Δ𝑘𝑘 The cost of innovation subsidized by the government, net innovation cost is 
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(𝑘𝑘 − Δ𝑘𝑘)𝑒𝑒2 
Φ Total subsidies, Φ = 𝑡𝑡𝐷𝐷 + Δ𝑘𝑘𝑒𝑒2 
𝜆𝜆 The fraction of the government subsidy received by the manufacturer; the 
remainder, 1 − 𝜆𝜆, goes to the retailer 
𝑤𝑤 Payment from the retailer to the manufacturer (wholesale price/transfer payment) 
𝛼𝛼 Constant marginal benefit of innovation effort for the government 
𝜋𝜋𝑀𝑀 Manufacturer’s profit function 
𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅 Retailer’s profit function 
𝜋𝜋𝐺𝐺  Government’s profit function 
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